To make the complaint and answers easier to read, I have combined them into one document. The answers are in this color and the comments are in this color.


1. The plaintiff, William Silverstein, is a natural person who was born and raised a citizen of Massachusetts, and was a citizen of Massachusetts at the time of the termination of his employment described herein and during most of the events thereafter that are alleged herein.
1. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations of paragraph 1.
So, they don't know if William Silverstein is a natural person....an android perhaps?

2. The plaintiff is currently residing out of state, which was necessitated to find employment as a result of the actions of the defendants herein, including both his termination and their refusal to re-employ him here.
2. Defendants are without knowledge as to plaintiff's current resident and otherwise denies the allegations of paragraph 2.
The defendants in their counterclaim admit that I am currently residing in Texas. The defendants have sent documents to my home in Texas.

3. The plaintiff intends to resume his residence in Massachusetts if he can obtain suitable employment here.
3. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations of paragraph 3.

4. On information and belief, defendant Microsystems Software, Inc ("MSI") is a Massachusetts Corporation, with a usual place of business at 600 Worcester Road, Framingham, Massachusetts.
4. Defendants admit that MSI is a Massachusetts corporation and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 4.

5. The plaintiff was employed by MSI from March 5, 1993 until late September 1996 as a software engineer, doing computer programming.
5. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 5.

6. On information and belief, defendant The Learning Company, Inc ("TLC") is a Delaware Corporation, with its usual place of business in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
6. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 6.

7. On information and belief, since the plaintiff was discharged by MSI, TLC has acquired the stock of MSI and controls the operations of MSI.
7. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 7.

8. On information and belief, the board of directors of MSI now consists of two members: Kevin O'Leary, the President of TLC, and Michael Perik, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of TLC, both of whom are based at One Athenaeum Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
8. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 8.

9. On information and belief, the Clerk of MSI is Neal Winneg, based at One Athenaeum Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts, who is also the Clerk of TLC.
9. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 9.

10. On information and belief, the Assistant Clerk of MSI is David McEvoy, also based at One Athenaeum Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
10. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 10.

11. On information and belief, the Treasurer of MSI is Alan Forsey, also based at One Athenaeum Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
11. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 11.

12. The only individual named in MSI's April, 1998 annual report to the Corporations Division of the Massachusetts Secretary of the Commonwealth who is not based at One Athenaeum Street Cambridge, Massachusetts, is Richard Gorgens, MSI's President.
12. Defendants admit that the only individual named in MSI's April, 1998 Annual Report to the Corporations Division of the Massachusetts Secretary of the Commonwealth who is not based at One Athenaeum Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts, is Richard Gorgens; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 12.

13. On information and belief, TLC presents MSI to the public as a division of TLC, not as a separate entity.
13. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 13.
Take a look at the MSI homepage, www.microsys.com. Then you can decide if  the defendants are lying.

14. On information and belief, TLC has merged MSI's operations with its own and runs MSI as an integrated part of its business, under common management and control.
14. Defendants admit that TLC has merged MSI's operations with its own and operates MSI's business as an integrated part of its business, under common management and control; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 14.

15. On information and belief, defendant Richard Gorgens is a natural person with his residence at  ################, Massachusetts, who was Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of MSI during and after the plaintiff's employment by MSI.
15. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 15.

16. On information and belief, defendant Richard Gorgens currently holds the title of President of MSI.
16. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 16.

17. On information and belief, defendant Debra Gorgens is a natural person with her residence at  ################, Massachusetts, and was Vice President and acting Director of Human Resources of MSI during and after the plaintiff's employment by MSI.
17. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 17.

18. On information and belief, defendant Larry Mason is a natural person with his place of business at 600 Worcester Road, Framingham, Massachusetts, and was the plaintiff's direct supervisor, and held the title of Director of Engineering of MSI during and after the plaintiff's employment by MSI.
18. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 18.

19. Defendants MSI, Richard Gorgens, Debra Gorgens, and Larry Mason are collectively referred to herein as the "MSI defendants."
19. Defendants state that paragraph 19 contains no factual allegation to which a response is necessary.

20. On information and belief, at the time of the plaintiff's employment with MSI, it was a closely-held company, with direct supervision of MSI's daily operations by each of the individual (non-corporate) MSI defendants.
20. Defendants admit that at the time of plaintiff's employment with MSI, MSI was a closely-held company; admit that Richard Gorgens, Debra Gorgens and Larry Mason supervised aspects of MSI's daily operations; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 20.

21. Until the time of his discharge by MSI, the plaintiff was engaged in development work on version 4.0 of MSI's local area networked calendar program, CaLANdar.
21. Defendants admit that in the several months prior to his discharge by MSI, plaintiff was engaged in development work on version 4.0 of MSI's local area networked calendar program, CaLANdar; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 21.

22. On May 17, 1995 the plaintiff was diagnosed with tendinitis.
22. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to allegations of paragraph 22.
MSI must not have read the emergency room report, nor any of the other medical documents provided to them.

23. On May 18, 1995 the plaintiff informed the defendant of that diagnosis and that it was a work-related injury.
23. Defendants admit that in May, 1995, plaintiff informed MSI of a problem with his wrist; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 23.

24. From May 1995 until May 1996 the plaintiff treated with multiple medical practitioners and multiple forms of treatment while his medical condition worsened.
24. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations of paragraph 24.
In a memo on 8/27/96 from Silverstein to MSI, this fact was made clear. Even if MSI did not believe this memo, MSI received copies of prescriptions and medical reports. Larry Mason even complained about Silverstein's doctor's visits. How can the defendants truthfully deny knowledge?

25. The plaintiff's condition worsened to the point that he suffered constant pain in his hands, wrists, and forearms, at times waking him up in pain during the night, and at times keeping him from getting to sleep at all.
25. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations of paragraph 25.
This was also stated in the 8/27/96 memo.

26. On May 10, 1996 the plaintiff was instructed by his treating physician to take three to four weeks away from work for acupuncture treatment. This information was relayed to the MSI defendants by the plaintiff, who told this to defendant Mason.
26. Defendants are without knowledge as to the first sentence of paragraph 26; admit that plaintiff informed defendant Mason of a purported need to take three weeks from work in order to obtain treatment for his wrists; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 26.
Larry Mason was informed of this by Silverstein. This may be another instance of selective memory loss.

27. In June and July of 1996 the plaintiff received acupuncture treatment.
27. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations of paragraph 27.
MSI knew of each appointments demanded to be told of each appointment.  MSI received a letter that stated that I was receiving accupuncture in that time period.

28. The doctor performing this treatment instructed the plaintiff to remain off of the keyboard and in a low stress environment for at least 18 hours following each treatment.
28. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations paragraph 28.
MSI must be ignoring the prescription that Deb Gorgens and Larry Mason received on 6/28/96.

29. The plaintiff was placed under increased scrutiny at work after he reported his injury.
29. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 29.

30. The plaintiff was harassed by one or more of the MSI defendants after he reported his injury.
30. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 30.

31. When the plaintiff followed the doctor's instructions regarding keyboarding he was given demeaning tasks.
31. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 31.

32. The plaintiff was repeatedly ordered to ignore his doctor's instructions.
32. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 32.
After receiving instructions from the plantiff's doctor to have the plaintiff spread his keyboarding over weekends, the defendants ordered him not to work on the weekend to allow his wrists to rest. Refer to paragraph 54.

33. The plaintiff requested the use of unused memory upgrade parts in MSI's possession to enable him to use voice-recognition software at his workstation to reduce his need to use the keyboard.
33. Defendants admit that plaintiff asked for extra memory; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 33.

34. The plaintiff's requests for the use of these parts was denied.
34. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 34.
The defendant admits to the request, but does not state that it was granted, what choice is left?

35. On information and belief, at no time did the MSI defendants have a medical evaluation done of the plaintiff that disputed the existence, seriousness, or work-related nature of the plaintiff's injury, or his need to take time off for treatment.
35. Defendants admit that the MSI defendants did not "have a medical evaluation done of the plaintiff;" and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 35.

36. On information and belief, at no time did the MSI defendants dispute the validity of the plaintiff's medical documentation.
36. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 36.
Under the FMLA( 29 CFR 825.307) if MSI really disputed the need for leave or the adequacy of my medical documentation, then MSI was required to follow the procedures under this regulation. Since they did not, they cannot dispute my condition now.

37. On information and belief, defendant Debra Gorgens, alone or together with one or more other of the MSI defendants, interfered with the plaintiff having an ergonomist hired by MSI's workers compensation insurer evaluate his workstation by cancelling the plaintiff's appointment.
37. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 37.

38. The appointment was rescheduled only after the plaintiff inquired directly of the insurer why no visit by the ergonomist had occurred.
38. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations of paragraph 38.

39. MSI advertised that CaLANdar 4.0 would be released in the Summer of 1996.
39. Defendants admit that some of MSI's advertising materials indicated that CaLANdar 4.0 would be released in the Summer of 1996; and otherwise deny tile allegations of paragraph 39.

40. On August 10, 1996 the plaintiff gave the MSI defendants, through defendant Mason, a letter from his treating physician recommending that he take three weeks off for treatment.
40. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 40.
If MSI did not receive documentation, then why did Deb Gorgens fax the workers compensation insurer asking for advice on this time off?

41. On information and belief, at no time did the MSI defendants produce any medical documentation that disputed the plaintiff's need for time off.
41. Defendants admit that the MSI defendants did not independently produce any medical documentation disputing plaintiff's need for time off; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 41.

42. On August 19, 1996 the plaintiff informed the MSI defendants, through defendant Mason, that he would be absent from September 11, 1996 until October 1, 1996 for medical treatment. The plaintiff later provided a copy of his scheduled airline flights to and from China, where he was going for acupuncture.
42. Defendants deny the first sentence of paragraph 42; admit that plaintiff later provided a copy of scheduled airline flights to and from China; and otherwise are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations of paragraph 42.
Another example of the defendants lying. This notification was in a written memo on 8/19/96. Larry Mason  passed this copy on to others at MSI, as signified by his note and initial on the bottom of the page. Mason had discussed this memo with Silverstein on 8/20/96 and memorialized this meeting in a memo on 8/21/96.

43. The plaintiff did not request that MSI pay for his travel to China or for his treatment.
43. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 43.

44. The plaintiff did not request that he be paid his salary during the time he was asking he be allowed to take off.
44. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 44.

45. On August 20, 1996, the announced CaLANdar 4.0 release date was September 3, 1996.
45. Defendants admit that on August 20, 1996 certain of MSI's marketing materials indicated a CaLANdar 4.0 release date of September 3, 1996 and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 45.
Here MSI admits this was the release date of CaLANdar 4.0. MSI stated that Silverstein could leave three weeks after this date. September 25th was more than 3 weeks after the date.

46. On August 20, 1996 defendant Mason complained about the time that the plaintiff was taking for medical treatment and told the plaintiff that he would not be permitted by MSI to take time off for medical treatment until three weeks had elapsed after the release of CaLANdar 4.0.
46. Defendants admit that Larry Mason informed plaintiff that he would be permitted to take time off for an unpaid personal leave three weeks after the CaLANdar 4.0 release date; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 46.

47. On information and belief, this was at the direction of defendant Richard Gorgens.
47. Defendants admit that Larry Mason informed plaintiff that he would be permitted to take time off for an unpaid personal leave with the concurrence of Richard Gorgens; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 47.

48. On or about August 20, 1996, the plaintiff informed the MSI defendants, through defendant Mason, that he would comply and delay his treatment until September 25, 1996. The plaintiff provided a revised itinerary of his airline flights, showing a travel time each way of more than one day.
48. Defendants admit that in August, 1996 plaintiff informed defendant Mason that his trip to China would commence on September 25, 1996; admit that plaintiff provided a revised travel itinerary; state that the revised itinerary speaks for itself; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 48.

49. On August 21, 1996, defendant Larry Mason informed the plaintiff, on behalf of the MSI defendants, that if he delayed his departure as requested, that defendant Richard Gorgens agreed that MSI would cover his insurance premiums for the period he was out.
49. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 49.

50. Subsequent to the plaintiff's informing defendant Mason of his revised plans, delaying his time off for treatment from September 11, 1996 to September 25, 1996, defendant Mason stated that MSI was not committed to any particular release date for CaLANdar 4.0, but would release it "when the pain of not releasing it exceeds the pain of releasing it."
50. Defendants admit that in early September, 1996 defendant Mason informed plaintiff that CaLANdar 4.0 did not have a specified release date; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 50.
MSI had already agreed that Silverstein could leave after 9/24/96. MSI never gave Silverstein another date that he may leave on. Does this mean that MSI would never allow Silverstein to receive medical treatment?

51. On information and belief, by August of 1996, CaLANdar 4.0 had been substantially finished for several weeks, and was undergoing only minor revisions.
51. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 51.

52. A product manager for CaLANdar 4.0 subsequently informed the plaintiff that the product manager had to give people release dates for CaLANdar 4.0, "while trying to keep a straight face."
52. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations of paragraph 52.

53. On information and belief, CaLANdar 4.0 was not released on September 3, 1996.
53. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 53.

54. On September 9, 1996 the plaintiff requested an accommodation of schedule modification to allow him to spend less time at the keyboard each weekday, and make up the time by coming in on weekends.
54. Defendants admit that on or about September 9, 1996 plaintiff provided a note from a physician stating that he should reduce his time at the keyboard per day by spreading it over weekends; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 54.

55. The schedule modification to spread the plaintiff's work across the weekends had been recommended in writing by the plaintiff's treating physician.
55. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 55.

56. On September 16, 1996 MSI's workers compensation carrier had an independent medical examination (IME) performed on the plaintiff.
56. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 56.

57. The IME doctor found that the plaintiff's condition was work-related, and recommended that the plaintiff change his lifestyle to not work at a computer keyboard, or else learn to live in pain.
57. Defendants state that the report of the IME doctor speaks for itself and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 57.

58. On September 17, 1996 the plaintiff informed the MSI defendants, through defendant Mason, of the recommendations made by the IME doctor.
58. Defendants admit that plaintiff informed defendant Mason that he had spoken with the IME doctor; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 58.

59. The MSI defendants, through defendant Mason, then took the office keys that were in the possession of the plaintiff, advising the plaintiff that to allow him to retain office keys would constitute impliedly agreeing that he could work on weekends - which defendant Mason said the MSI defendants felt would be detrimental to the plaintiff's condition.
59. Defendants admit that defendant Mason obtained plaintiff's office keys; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 59.
MSI took the keys after being told about the IME report(MSI acknowledges being told in paragraph 58). This suggests that they planned on firing me, or it is a highly improbable coincidence.

60. The plaintiff's medical condition was worsened by the delay in treatment demanded by the defendant.
60. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 60.
From the time that the defendants were informed of the need for the leave to the time that Silverstein, the pain had gone from being only when working to being constant pain.

61. The plaintiff spent additional monies for medical treatment due to the delay in treatment that the MSI defendants demanded.
61. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to additional money spent by plaintiff; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 61.

62. On September 24, 1996, on the eve of the plaintiff's departure for China, the MSI defendants, through defendant Mason, requested that the plaintiff provide the passwords to software personally owned by the plaintiff, "in case we need to make changes while you are away."
62, Defendants admit that defendant Mason requested that plaintiff provide software passwords in case they were needed while he was away; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 62.

63. On September 24, 1996 the MSI defendants, through defendant Mason, asked the plaintiff how to contact him by electronic mail.
63. Defendants admit that prior to plaintiff's trip to China, defendant Mason asked how he could contact plaintiff via electronic mail; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 63.

64. The MSI defendants at no time prior to his departure informed the plaintiff that he would be fired if he took his announced three-week leave for treatment.
64. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 64.

65. This constituted implied permission for him to take that leave in the same manner that not taking his keys away would have constituted implied permission for him to work on weekends.
65. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 65.

66. On information and belief, on Thursday, September 26, 1996 at 5:32 pm Boston time (5:32 am China time) the MSI defendants, through defendant Mason, sent electronic mail to the plaintiff instructing him to return for work by Friday, September 27, 1996 and that if the plaintiff did not return to work by then, he would be considered to have abandoned his job.
66. Defendants admit that on Thursday, September 26, 1996 at 5:32 pm. Boston time, defendant Mason sent an electronic mail message to plaintiff instructing him to return for work by Friday, September 27, 1996 and indicating that if plaintiff did not return to work by then, he would be considered to have abandoned his job; state that they are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to whether the electronic message was sent at 5:32 a.m. "China time"; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 66.
The plantiff was out on September 25, 1996. Why did they wait until September 26, when it was impossible to return, to order the plaintiff to return to work? If the defendants really wanted to plantiff to return, they would have emailed on September 25, when it was possible to return in time.

67. The itinerary that the plaintiff had provided to the MSI defendants through defendant Mason showed that it would take longer than one day for the plaintiff to return from China, even if he had been able to arrange an immediate return trip.
67. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 67.
They deny that it's impossible to return, but they have not explained how I could have gotten back in time. Maybe they thought I had a transporter?

68. The electronic mail sent on September 26, 1996 at 5:32 pm (Boston time) was received by the plaintiff in China approximately a half hour later, on September 27, 1996 at approximately 6:00 am (China time).
68. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 68, except to state that they are without knowledge as to whether the electronic mail message was received at approximately 6:00 a.m. "China time."

69. The plaintiff e-mailed defendant Mason in response, requesting that any action on the termination be deferred until the plaintiff returned from receiving medical treatment.
69. Defendants admit that plaintiff sent e-mail to defendant Mason suggesting that the termination be deferred until he returned; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 69.

70. On September 30, 1996 the MSI defendants, by defendant Mason, sent electronic mail to the plaintiff informing him that he had been fired.
70. Defendants admit that MSI, through defendant Mason, sent an electronic mail message to plaintiff informing him of his termination on September 30. 1996; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 70.

71. The decisions of the MSI defendants (1) not to tell the plaintiff that he would be fired if he took his announced three week leave for treatment, (2) to wait to send him an ultimatum to return until he was too far away to do so within the time demanded, and (3) to fire him when he did not comply, evidences an intent on the part of the MSI defendants to discriminate against the plaintiff on the basis of handicap and also evidences an intent on their part to discriminate and/or retaliate against him for his assertion of rights protected by state and federal statutes.
71. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 71.

72. On information and belief, CaLANdar 4.0 was released on September 27, 1996.
72. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 72.

73. On information and belief, when released, CaLANdar 4.0 did not work significantly better than the version that existed on September 3, 1996
73. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 73.

74. On information and belief, the MSI defendants delayed the release of CaLANdar 4.0 in part to give themselves justification for firing the plaintiff, by forcing him to take time off prior to three weeks after the product's release.
74. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 74.

75. On October 25, 1996 the MSI defendants refused to allow the plaintiff to retrieve his property.
75. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 75.

76. The MSI defendants, through defendant Debra Gorgens, refused to allow the plaintiff to return to work on December 18, 1996.
76. Defendants admit that MSI, through defendant Debra Gorgens, refused plaintiff's request to return to work in December, 1996; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 76.

77. The plaintiff complained of MSI's treatment of him to the United States Department of Labor.
77. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 77.

78. On information and belief, the investigator from the United States Department of Labor requested that MSI reinstate the plaintiff, which request was refused by MSI.
78. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 78.

79. On information and belief, the United States Department of Labor chose not to pursue the matter beyond the initial investigatory stage upon learning that the plaintiff was represented by private counsel.
79. Defendants admit that the United States Department of Labor chose not to pursue the matter beyond the initial investigatory stage; and otherwise are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations of paragraph 79.

80. The plaintiff sought and received weekly benefits under the Massachusetts Workers' Compensation law from MSI in a written settlement before the Massachusetts Department of Industrial Accidents ("DIA").
80. Defendants admit that plaintiff Sought weekly benefits under- the Massachusetts Workers' Compensation Law from MSI and that the parties ultimately entered into a written settlement of plaintiff's claim approved by the Massachusetts Department of Industrial Accidents; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 80.

81. The written settlement agreement before the DIA, while stating that it did not constitute a stipulation that the plaintiff's injury was work-related, did not dispute that the plaintiff was totally-disabled during the time he had taken off for treatment in September of 1996.
81. Defendants state that the written settlement speaks for itself; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 81.
Let it speak for itself.

82. On information and belief, if the plaintiff had not taken the time off from work, he could have become permanently disabled.
82. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations of paragraph 82.

83. The MSI defendants, through defendant Debra Gorgens, refused to allow the plaintiff to exercise his remaining stock options on the basis that he had been fired.
83. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 83.

84. The refusal of MSI to allow the plaintiff to exercise his remaining stock options caused him economic harm when TLC acquired MSI through the purchase of all shares of MSI from MSI's stockholders.
84. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 84.

85. The MSI defendants took possession of software written by the plaintiff.
85. Defendants admit that MSI retained possession of software written by plaintiff; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 85.

86. The MSI defendants took possession of software licensed to the plaintiff.
86. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 86.

87. MSI posted openings for technical support engineers, a position for which the plaintiff was qualified due to his familiarity with the company's programs.
87. Defendants admit that MSI has in the past posted openings for technical support engineers; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 87.

88. The plaintiff applied to MSI for re-employment in December of 1996, and in February and April of 1997.
88. Defendants admit that plaintiff sought re-employment with MSI in December of 1996 and once in 1997; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 88.

89. The plaintiff applied to TLC for employment in April of 1998, after TLC had acquired MSI.
89. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 89.

90. Defendant Debra Gorgens acknowledged receipt of the plaintiff's resume on behalf of MSI when he sought re-employment in 1997.
90. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 90.

91. The plaintiff was not interviewed or hired for any job for which he applied at MSI or TLC after his return from China.
91. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 91.

92. The plaintiff's job was still advertised as being open by MSI in 1998 after he had been turned down for re-employment by MSI and for employment with TLC.
92. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 92.

93. By their refusal to consider the plaintiff for employment after his return from China, the MSI defendants and TLC discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of handicap.
93. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 93.

94. By their refusal to consider the plaintiff for employment after his return from China, the MSI defendants and TLC discriminated and retaliated against the plaintiff for his exercise of statutory rights under Massachusetts and United States laws.
94. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 94.

95. The actions of the MSI defendants constitute a continuous course of wrongful conduct, from their refusal of and interference with the plaintiff's efforts to obtain reasonable accommodations for his handicap through their discrimination and retaliation against him on account of that handicap and on account of his assertion of his legally-protected rights to accommodation and redress for the defendant's actions.
95. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 95.

96. The plaintiff was not able to locate successor employment until May of 1997, which required relocating himself and his family to Texas from Massachusetts.
96. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations of paragraph 96.

97. The plaintiff's successor employment is as a software engineer.
97. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations of paragraph 97.

98. Relocating himself and his family to Texas resulted in reducing the plaintiff's family income even after he found re-employment, as his wife had to leave a secure job in Massachusetts for a less-secure, lower-paying job in Texas, and his own employment in Texas is not an on-going full-time position but a series of temporary positions, resulting in serious damage to his career.
98. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations of paragraph 98.

99. On August 20, 1997 the plaintiff had surgery to correct a medical condition known as a supracondylar process.
99. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations of paragraph 99.

100. The supracondylar process was a congenital condition that made the plaintiff more susceptible to tendinitis from extended work at a computer keyboard.
100. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations of paragraph 100.

101. The plaintiff has sustained harm in the form of lost salary, lost benefits, lost stock options, job hunting expenses, expenses in relocating his family, lost earning capacity of his family, lost earning capacity through delay in his career path, additional expenses, physical pain, emotional distress, and otherwise, due to the actions of the defendants.
101. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 101.