To make the complaint and answers easier to read, I have combined them into one document. The answers are in this color and the comments are in this color.
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
MIDDLESEX, ss.
SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION
NO. 98-4820
WILLIAM SILVERSTEIN, Plaintiff
v.
MICROSYSTEMS SOFTWARE, INC. THE LEARNING COMPANY, INC., RICHARD GORGENS, DEBRA GORGENS,
LARRY MASON, Defendants
AMENDED COMPLAINT
Jury Trial Demanded
Pursuant to Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), the plaintiff hereby amends his Complaint as a matter of course, prior to the service of a responsive pleading, as to read follows:
1. The plaintiff, William Silverstein, is a natural person who was born and raised a
citizen of Massachusetts, and was a citizen of Massachusetts at the time of the
termination of his employment described herein and during most of the events thereafter
that are alleged herein.
1. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the allegations of paragraph 1.
So, they don't know if William Silverstein is a natural
person....an android perhaps?
2. The plaintiff is currently residing out of state, which was necessitated to find
employment as a result of the actions of the defendants herein, including both his
termination and their refusal to re-employ him here.
2. Defendants are without knowledge as to plaintiff's current
resident and otherwise denies the allegations of paragraph 2.
The defendants in their counterclaim admit that I am currently residing in Texas. The
defendants have sent documents to my home in Texas.
3. The plaintiff intends to resume his residence in Massachusetts if he can obtain
suitable employment here.
3. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the allegations of paragraph 3.
4. On information and belief, defendant Microsystems Software, Inc ("MSI") is
a Massachusetts Corporation, with a usual place of business at 600 Worcester Road,
Framingham, Massachusetts.
4. Defendants admit that MSI is a Massachusetts corporation and
otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 4.
5. The plaintiff was employed by MSI from March 5, 1993 until late September 1996 as a
software engineer, doing computer programming.
5. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 5.
6. On information and belief, defendant The Learning Company, Inc ("TLC") is
a Delaware Corporation, with its usual place of business in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
6. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 6.
7. On information and belief, since the plaintiff was discharged by MSI, TLC has
acquired the stock of MSI and controls the operations of MSI.
7. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 7.
8. On information and belief, the board of directors of MSI now consists of two
members: Kevin O'Leary, the President of TLC, and Michael Perik, the Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of TLC, both of whom are based at One Athenaeum Street, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
8. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 8.
9. On information and belief, the Clerk of MSI is Neal Winneg, based at One Athenaeum
Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts, who is also the Clerk of TLC.
9. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 9.
10. On information and belief, the Assistant Clerk of MSI is David McEvoy, also based
at One Athenaeum Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
10. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 10.
11. On information and belief, the Treasurer of MSI is Alan Forsey, also based at One
Athenaeum Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
11. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 11.
12. The only individual named in MSI's April, 1998 annual report to the Corporations
Division of the Massachusetts Secretary of the Commonwealth who is not based at One
Athenaeum Street Cambridge, Massachusetts, is Richard Gorgens, MSI's President.
12. Defendants admit that the only individual named in MSI's April,
1998 Annual Report to the Corporations Division of the Massachusetts Secretary of the
Commonwealth who is not based at One Athenaeum Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts, is
Richard Gorgens; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 12.
13. On information and belief, TLC presents MSI to the public as a division of TLC, not
as a separate entity.
13. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 13.
Take a look at the MSI homepage, www.microsys.com. Then you can decide if the
defendants are lying.
14. On information and belief, TLC has merged MSI's operations with its own and runs
MSI as an integrated part of its business, under common management and control.
14. Defendants admit that TLC has merged MSI's operations with its
own and operates MSI's business as an integrated part of its business, under common
management and control; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 14.
15. On information and belief, defendant Richard Gorgens is a natural person with his
residence at ################, Massachusetts, who was Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of MSI during and after the plaintiff's employment by MSI.
15. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 15.
16. On information and belief, defendant Richard Gorgens currently holds the title of
President of MSI.
16. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 16.
17. On information and belief, defendant Debra Gorgens is a natural person with her
residence at ################, Massachusetts, and was Vice President and acting
Director of Human Resources of MSI during and after the plaintiff's employment by MSI.
17. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 17.
18. On information and belief, defendant Larry Mason is a natural person with his place
of business at 600 Worcester Road, Framingham, Massachusetts, and was the plaintiff's
direct supervisor, and held the title of Director of Engineering of MSI during and after
the plaintiff's employment by MSI.
18. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 18.
19. Defendants MSI, Richard Gorgens, Debra Gorgens, and Larry Mason are collectively
referred to herein as the "MSI defendants."
19. Defendants state that paragraph 19 contains no factual
allegation to which a response is necessary.
20. On information and belief, at the time of the plaintiff's employment with MSI, it
was a closely-held company, with direct supervision of MSI's daily operations by each of
the individual (non-corporate) MSI defendants.
20. Defendants admit that at the time of plaintiff's employment with
MSI, MSI was a closely-held company; admit that Richard Gorgens, Debra Gorgens and Larry
Mason supervised aspects of MSI's daily operations; and otherwise deny the allegations of
paragraph 20.
21. Until the time of his discharge by MSI, the plaintiff was engaged in development
work on version 4.0 of MSI's local area networked calendar program, CaLANdar.
21. Defendants admit that in the several months prior to his
discharge by MSI, plaintiff was engaged in development work on version 4.0 of MSI's local
area networked calendar program, CaLANdar; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph
21.
22. On May 17, 1995 the plaintiff was diagnosed with tendinitis.
22. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to allegations of paragraph 22.
MSI must not have read the emergency room report, nor any of the
other medical documents provided to them.
23. On May 18, 1995 the plaintiff informed the defendant of that diagnosis and that it
was a work-related injury.
23. Defendants admit that in May, 1995, plaintiff informed MSI of a
problem with his wrist; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 23.
24. From May 1995 until May 1996 the plaintiff treated with multiple medical
practitioners and multiple forms of treatment while his medical condition worsened.
24. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the allegations of paragraph 24.
In a memo on 8/27/96 from Silverstein to MSI, this fact was made
clear. Even if MSI did not believe this memo, MSI received copies of prescriptions and
medical reports. Larry Mason even complained about Silverstein's doctor's visits. How can
the defendants truthfully deny knowledge?
25. The plaintiff's condition worsened to the point that he suffered constant pain in
his hands, wrists, and forearms, at times waking him up in pain during the night, and at
times keeping him from getting to sleep at all.
25. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the allegations of paragraph 25.
This was also stated in the 8/27/96 memo.
26. On May 10, 1996 the plaintiff was instructed by his treating physician to take
three to four weeks away from work for acupuncture treatment. This information was relayed
to the MSI defendants by the plaintiff, who told this to defendant Mason.
26. Defendants are without knowledge as to the first sentence of
paragraph 26; admit that plaintiff informed defendant Mason of a purported need to take
three weeks from work in order to obtain treatment for his wrists; and otherwise deny the
allegations of paragraph 26.
Larry Mason was informed of this by Silverstein. This may be
another instance of selective memory loss.
27. In June and July of 1996 the plaintiff received acupuncture treatment.
27. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the allegations of paragraph 27.
MSI knew of each appointments demanded to be told of each
appointment. MSI received a letter
that stated that I was receiving accupuncture in that time period.
28. The doctor performing this treatment instructed the plaintiff to remain off of the
keyboard and in a low stress environment for at least 18 hours following each treatment.
28. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the allegations paragraph 28.
MSI must be ignoring the prescription that Deb Gorgens and Larry Mason received on
6/28/96.
29. The plaintiff was placed under increased scrutiny at work after he reported his
injury.
29. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 29.
30. The plaintiff was harassed by one or more of the MSI defendants after he reported
his injury.
30. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 30.
31. When the plaintiff followed the doctor's instructions regarding keyboarding he was
given demeaning tasks.
31. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 31.
32. The plaintiff was repeatedly ordered to ignore his doctor's instructions.
32. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 32.
After receiving instructions from the plantiff's doctor to have
the plaintiff spread his keyboarding over weekends, the defendants ordered him not to work
on the weekend to allow his wrists to rest. Refer to paragraph 54.
33. The plaintiff requested the use of unused memory upgrade parts in MSI's possession
to enable him to use voice-recognition software at his workstation to reduce his need to
use the keyboard.
33. Defendants admit that plaintiff asked for extra memory; and
otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 33.
34. The plaintiff's requests for the use of these parts was denied.
34. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 34.
The defendant admits to the request, but does not state that it
was granted, what choice is left?
35. On information and belief, at no time did the MSI defendants have a medical
evaluation done of the plaintiff that disputed the existence, seriousness, or work-related
nature of the plaintiff's injury, or his need to take time off for treatment.
35. Defendants admit that the MSI defendants did not "have a
medical evaluation done of the plaintiff;" and otherwise deny the allegations of
paragraph 35.
36. On information and belief, at no time did the MSI defendants dispute the validity
of the plaintiff's medical documentation.
36. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 36.
Under the FMLA( 29 CFR 825.307) if
MSI really disputed the need for leave or the adequacy of my medical documentation, then
MSI was required to follow the procedures under this regulation. Since they did not, they
cannot dispute my condition now.
37. On information and belief, defendant Debra Gorgens, alone or together with one or
more other of the MSI defendants, interfered with the plaintiff having an ergonomist hired
by MSI's workers compensation insurer evaluate his workstation by cancelling the
plaintiff's appointment.
37. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 37.
38. The appointment was rescheduled only after the plaintiff inquired directly of the
insurer why no visit by the ergonomist had occurred.
38. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the allegations of paragraph 38.
39. MSI advertised that CaLANdar 4.0 would be released in the Summer of 1996.
39. Defendants admit that some of MSI's advertising materials
indicated that CaLANdar 4.0 would be released in the Summer of 1996; and otherwise deny
tile allegations of paragraph 39.
40. On August 10, 1996 the plaintiff gave the MSI defendants, through defendant Mason,
a letter from his treating physician recommending that he take three weeks off for
treatment.
40. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 40.
If MSI did not receive documentation, then why did Deb Gorgens fax the workers compensation insurer asking for
advice on this time off?
41. On information and belief, at no time did the MSI defendants produce any medical
documentation that disputed the plaintiff's need for time off.
41. Defendants admit that the MSI defendants did not independently
produce any medical documentation disputing plaintiff's need for time off; and otherwise
deny the allegations of paragraph 41.
42. On August 19, 1996 the plaintiff informed the MSI defendants, through defendant
Mason, that he would be absent from September 11, 1996 until October 1, 1996 for medical
treatment. The plaintiff later provided a copy of his scheduled airline flights to and
from China, where he was going for acupuncture.
42. Defendants deny the first sentence of paragraph 42; admit that
plaintiff later provided a copy of scheduled airline flights to and from China; and
otherwise are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
allegations of paragraph 42.
Another example of the defendants lying. This notification was in a written memo on 8/19/96. Larry
Mason passed this copy on to others at MSI, as signified by his note and initial on
the bottom of the page. Mason had discussed this memo with Silverstein on 8/20/96 and
memorialized this meeting in a memo on 8/21/96.
43. The plaintiff did not request that MSI pay for his travel to China or for his
treatment.
43. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 43.
44. The plaintiff did not request that he be paid his salary during the time he was
asking he be allowed to take off.
44. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 44.
45. On August 20, 1996, the announced CaLANdar 4.0 release date was September 3, 1996.
45. Defendants admit that on August 20, 1996 certain of MSI's
marketing materials indicated a CaLANdar 4.0 release date of September 3, 1996 and
otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 45.
Here MSI admits this was the release date of CaLANdar 4.0. MSI
stated that Silverstein could leave three weeks after this date. September 25th was more
than 3 weeks after the date.
46. On August 20, 1996 defendant Mason complained about the time that the plaintiff was
taking for medical treatment and told the plaintiff that he would not be permitted by MSI
to take time off for medical treatment until three weeks had elapsed after the release of
CaLANdar 4.0.
46. Defendants admit that Larry Mason informed plaintiff that he
would be permitted to take time off for an unpaid personal leave three weeks after the
CaLANdar 4.0 release date; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 46.
47. On information and belief, this was at the direction of defendant Richard Gorgens.
47. Defendants admit that Larry Mason informed plaintiff that he
would be permitted to take time off for an unpaid personal leave with the concurrence of
Richard Gorgens; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 47.
48. On or about August 20, 1996, the plaintiff informed the MSI defendants, through
defendant Mason, that he would comply and delay his treatment until September 25, 1996.
The plaintiff provided a revised itinerary of his airline flights, showing a travel time
each way of more than one day.
48. Defendants admit that in August, 1996 plaintiff informed
defendant Mason that his trip to China would commence on September 25, 1996; admit that
plaintiff provided a revised travel itinerary; state that the revised itinerary speaks for
itself; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 48.
49. On August 21, 1996, defendant Larry Mason informed the plaintiff, on behalf of the
MSI defendants, that if he delayed his departure as requested, that defendant Richard
Gorgens agreed that MSI would cover his insurance premiums for the period he was out.
49. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 49.
50. Subsequent to the plaintiff's informing defendant Mason of his revised plans,
delaying his time off for treatment from September 11, 1996 to September 25, 1996,
defendant Mason stated that MSI was not committed to any particular release date for
CaLANdar 4.0, but would release it "when the pain of not releasing it exceeds the
pain of releasing it."
50. Defendants admit that in early September, 1996 defendant Mason
informed plaintiff that CaLANdar 4.0 did not have a specified release date; and otherwise
deny the allegations of paragraph 50.
MSI had already agreed that Silverstein could leave after
9/24/96. MSI never gave Silverstein another date that he may leave on. Does this mean that
MSI would never allow Silverstein to receive medical treatment?
51. On information and belief, by August of 1996, CaLANdar 4.0 had been substantially
finished for several weeks, and was undergoing only minor revisions.
51. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 51.
52. A product manager for CaLANdar 4.0 subsequently informed the plaintiff that the
product manager had to give people release dates for CaLANdar 4.0, "while trying to
keep a straight face."
52. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the allegations of paragraph 52.
53. On information and belief, CaLANdar 4.0 was not released on September 3, 1996.
53. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 53.
54. On September 9, 1996 the plaintiff requested an accommodation of schedule
modification to allow him to spend less time at the keyboard each weekday, and make up the
time by coming in on weekends.
54. Defendants admit that on or about September 9, 1996 plaintiff
provided a note from a physician stating that he should reduce his time at the keyboard
per day by spreading it over weekends; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 54.
55. The schedule modification to spread the plaintiff's work across the weekends had
been recommended in writing by the plaintiff's treating physician.
55. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 55.
56. On September 16, 1996 MSI's workers compensation carrier had an independent medical
examination (IME) performed on the plaintiff.
56. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 56.
57. The IME doctor found that the plaintiff's condition was work-related, and
recommended that the plaintiff change his lifestyle to not work at a computer keyboard, or
else learn to live in pain.
57. Defendants state that the report of the IME doctor speaks for itself and otherwise deny the
allegations of paragraph 57.
58. On September 17, 1996 the plaintiff informed the MSI defendants, through defendant
Mason, of the recommendations made by the IME doctor.
58. Defendants admit that plaintiff informed defendant Mason that he
had spoken with the IME doctor; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 58.
59. The MSI defendants, through defendant Mason, then took the office keys that were in
the possession of the plaintiff, advising the plaintiff that to allow him to retain office
keys would constitute impliedly agreeing that he could work on weekends - which defendant
Mason said the MSI defendants felt would be detrimental to the plaintiff's condition.
59. Defendants admit that defendant Mason obtained plaintiff's
office keys; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 59.
MSI took the keys after being told about the IME report(MSI
acknowledges being told in paragraph 58). This suggests that they planned on firing me, or
it is a highly improbable coincidence.
60. The plaintiff's medical condition was worsened by the delay in treatment demanded
by the defendant.
60. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 60.
From the time that the defendants were informed of the
need for the leave to the time that Silverstein, the pain had gone from being only when
working to being constant pain.
61. The plaintiff spent additional monies for medical treatment due to the delay in
treatment that the MSI defendants demanded.
61. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to additional money spent by plaintiff; and otherwise deny the
allegations of paragraph 61.
62. On September 24, 1996, on the eve of the plaintiff's departure for China, the MSI
defendants, through defendant Mason, requested that the plaintiff provide the passwords to
software personally owned by the plaintiff, "in case we need to make changes while
you are away."
62, Defendants admit that defendant Mason requested that plaintiff
provide software passwords in case they were needed while he was away; and otherwise deny
the allegations of paragraph 62.
63. On September 24, 1996 the MSI defendants, through defendant Mason, asked the
plaintiff how to contact him by electronic mail.
63. Defendants admit that prior to plaintiff's trip to China,
defendant Mason asked how he could contact plaintiff via electronic mail; and otherwise
deny the allegations of paragraph 63.
64. The MSI defendants at no time prior to his departure informed the plaintiff that he
would be fired if he took his announced three-week leave for treatment.
64. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 64.
65. This constituted implied permission for him to take that leave in the same manner
that not taking his keys away would have constituted implied permission for him to work on
weekends.
65. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 65.
66. On information and belief, on Thursday, September 26, 1996 at 5:32 pm Boston time
(5:32 am China time) the MSI defendants, through defendant Mason, sent electronic
mail to the plaintiff instructing him to return for work by Friday, September 27, 1996 and
that if the plaintiff did not return to work by then, he would be considered to have
abandoned his job.
66. Defendants admit that on Thursday, September 26, 1996 at 5:32
pm. Boston time, defendant Mason sent an electronic mail message to plaintiff instructing
him to return for work by Friday, September 27, 1996 and indicating that if plaintiff did
not return to work by then, he would be considered to have abandoned his job; state that
they are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to whether the
electronic message was sent at 5:32 a.m. "China time"; and otherwise deny the
allegations of paragraph 66.
The plantiff was out on September 25, 1996. Why did they wait
until September 26, when it was impossible to return, to order the plaintiff to return to
work? If the defendants really wanted to plantiff to return, they would have emailed on
September 25, when it was possible to return in time.
67. The itinerary that the plaintiff had provided to the MSI defendants through
defendant Mason showed that it would take longer than one day for the plaintiff to return
from China, even if he had been able to arrange an immediate return trip.
67. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 67.
They deny that it's impossible to return, but they have not
explained how I could have gotten back in time. Maybe they thought I had a transporter?
68. The electronic mail sent on September 26, 1996 at 5:32 pm (Boston time) was
received by the plaintiff in China approximately a half hour later, on September 27, 1996
at approximately 6:00 am (China time).
68. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 68, except to
state that they are without knowledge as to whether the electronic mail message was
received at approximately 6:00 a.m. "China time."
69. The plaintiff e-mailed defendant Mason in response, requesting that any action on
the termination be deferred until the plaintiff returned from receiving medical treatment.
69. Defendants admit that plaintiff sent e-mail to defendant Mason
suggesting that the termination be deferred until he returned; and otherwise deny the
allegations of paragraph 69.
70. On September 30, 1996 the MSI defendants, by defendant Mason, sent electronic mail
to the plaintiff informing him that he had been fired.
70. Defendants admit that MSI, through defendant Mason, sent an
electronic mail message to plaintiff informing him of his termination on September 30.
1996; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 70.
71. The decisions of the MSI defendants (1) not to tell the plaintiff that he would be
fired if he took his announced three week leave for treatment, (2) to wait to send him an
ultimatum to return until he was too far away to do so within the time demanded, and (3)
to fire him when he did not comply, evidences an intent on the part of the MSI defendants
to discriminate against the plaintiff on the basis of handicap and also evidences an
intent on their part to discriminate and/or retaliate against him for his assertion of
rights protected by state and federal statutes.
71. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 71.
72. On information and belief, CaLANdar 4.0 was released on September 27, 1996.
72. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 72.
73. On information and belief, when released, CaLANdar 4.0 did not work significantly
better than the version that existed on September 3, 1996
73. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 73.
74. On information and belief, the MSI defendants delayed the release of CaLANdar 4.0
in part to give themselves justification for firing the plaintiff, by forcing him to take
time off prior to three weeks after the product's release.
74. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 74.
75. On October 25, 1996 the MSI defendants refused to allow the plaintiff to retrieve
his property.
75. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 75.
76. The MSI defendants, through defendant Debra Gorgens, refused to allow the plaintiff
to return to work on December 18, 1996.
76. Defendants admit that MSI, through defendant Debra Gorgens,
refused plaintiff's request to return to work in December, 1996; and otherwise deny the
allegations of paragraph 76.
77. The plaintiff complained of MSI's treatment of him to the United States Department
of Labor.
77. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 77.
78. On information and belief, the investigator from the United States Department of
Labor requested that MSI reinstate the plaintiff, which request was refused by MSI.
78. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 78.
79. On information and belief, the United States Department of Labor chose not to
pursue the matter beyond the initial investigatory stage upon learning that the plaintiff
was represented by private counsel.
79. Defendants admit that the United States Department of Labor
chose not to pursue the matter beyond the initial investigatory stage; and otherwise are
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations of
paragraph 79.
80. The plaintiff sought and received weekly benefits under the Massachusetts Workers'
Compensation law from MSI in a written settlement before the Massachusetts Department of
Industrial Accidents ("DIA").
80. Defendants admit that plaintiff Sought weekly benefits under-
the Massachusetts Workers' Compensation Law from MSI and that the parties ultimately
entered into a written settlement of plaintiff's claim approved by the Massachusetts
Department of Industrial Accidents; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 80.
81. The written settlement agreement before the DIA, while stating that it did not
constitute a stipulation that the plaintiff's injury was work-related, did not dispute
that the plaintiff was totally-disabled during the time he had taken off for treatment in
September of 1996.
81. Defendants state that the written settlement speaks for itself;
and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 81.
Let it speak for itself.
82. On information and belief, if the plaintiff had not taken the time off from work,
he could have become permanently disabled.
82. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the allegations of paragraph 82.
83. The MSI defendants, through defendant Debra Gorgens, refused to allow the plaintiff
to exercise his remaining stock options on the basis that he had been fired.
83. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 83.
84. The refusal of MSI to allow the plaintiff to exercise his remaining stock options
caused him economic harm when TLC acquired MSI through the purchase of all shares of MSI
from MSI's stockholders.
84. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 84.
85. The MSI defendants took possession of software written by the plaintiff.
85. Defendants admit that MSI retained possession of software
written by plaintiff; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 85.
86. The MSI defendants took possession of software licensed to the plaintiff.
86. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 86.
87. MSI posted openings for technical support engineers, a position for which the
plaintiff was qualified due to his familiarity with the company's programs.
87. Defendants admit that MSI has in the past posted openings for
technical support engineers; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 87.
88. The plaintiff applied to MSI for re-employment in December of 1996, and in February
and April of 1997.
88. Defendants admit that plaintiff sought re-employment with MSI in
December of 1996 and once in 1997; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 88.
89. The plaintiff applied to TLC for employment in April of 1998, after TLC had
acquired MSI.
89. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 89.
90. Defendant Debra Gorgens acknowledged receipt of the plaintiff's resume on behalf of
MSI when he sought re-employment in 1997.
90. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 90.
91. The plaintiff was not interviewed or hired for any job for which he applied at MSI
or TLC after his return from China.
91. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 91.
92. The plaintiff's job was still advertised as being open by MSI in 1998 after he had
been turned down for re-employment by MSI and for employment with TLC.
92. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 92.
93. By their refusal to consider the plaintiff for employment after his return from
China, the MSI defendants and TLC discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of
handicap.
93. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 93.
94. By their refusal to consider the plaintiff for employment after his return from
China, the MSI defendants and TLC discriminated and retaliated against the plaintiff for
his exercise of statutory rights under Massachusetts and United States laws.
94. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 94.
95. The actions of the MSI defendants constitute a continuous course of wrongful
conduct, from their refusal of and interference with the plaintiff's efforts to obtain
reasonable accommodations for his handicap through their discrimination and retaliation
against him on account of that handicap and on account of his assertion of his
legally-protected rights to accommodation and redress for the defendant's actions.
95. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 95.
96. The plaintiff was not able to locate successor employment until May of 1997, which
required relocating himself and his family to Texas from Massachusetts.
96. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the allegations of paragraph 96.
97. The plaintiff's successor employment is as a software engineer.
97. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the allegations of paragraph 97.
98. Relocating himself and his family to Texas resulted in reducing the plaintiff's
family income even after he found re-employment, as his wife had to leave a secure job in
Massachusetts for a less-secure, lower-paying job in Texas, and his own employment in
Texas is not an on-going full-time position but a series of temporary positions, resulting
in serious damage to his career.
98. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the allegations of paragraph 98.
99. On August 20, 1997 the plaintiff had surgery to correct a medical condition known
as a supracondylar process.
99. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the allegations of paragraph 99.
100. The supracondylar process was a congenital condition that made the plaintiff more
susceptible to tendinitis from extended work at a computer keyboard.
100. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the allegations of paragraph 100.
101. The plaintiff has sustained harm in the form of lost salary, lost benefits, lost
stock options, job hunting expenses, expenses in relocating his family, lost earning
capacity of his family, lost earning capacity through delay in his career path, additional
expenses, physical pain, emotional distress, and otherwise, due to the actions of the
defendants.
101. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 101.
Workers Compensation - Discrimination and Retaliation
Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 152, § 75B
102. The facts set forth above are hereby incorporated in full with the same force and
effect as if they had been individually realleged herein.
102. Defendants incorporate herein their responses to paragraphs 1
through 101.
103. The plaintiff sustained a work-related injury, within the meaning of chapter 152
of the General Laws.
103. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 103.
MSI already admitted that Silverstein received a settlement under
MGL c.152.
104. The plaintiff would have been capable of performing the
essential functions of his job with reasonable accommodations, within the meaning of
75B of chapter 152 of the General Laws.
104. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 104.
Here MSI is denies that Silverstein could do his job. MSI demands
that Silverstein be in the office, even though MSI agrees that Silverstein was unable to
work.
105. The plaintiff requested various reasonable accommodations for his handicap from
the MSI defendants, including periodic breaks from keyboarding during the work day, days
off for medical treatment, ergonomic consultation and modification to his workstation, and
re-arrangement of his work schedule.
105. Defendants admit that plaintiff requested periodic breaks from
keyboarding during the workday, days off for medical treatment, ergonomic consultation and
modification to his workstation, and re-arrangement of his work schedule; and otherwise
deny the allegations of paragraph 105.
106. In response to those requested accommodations, the MSI defendants subjected the
plaintiff to increased scrutiny, harassment, and direct interference with the plaintiff's
efforts to improve his ability to do his job while maintaining his health.
106. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 106.
107. The plaintiff requested, as a reasonable accommodation, three weeks time off from
work to obtain medical treatment for his handicap.
107. Defendants admit that plaintiff requested three weeks time off
from work to obtain treatment for his purported medical condition; and otherwise deny the
allegations of paragraph 107.
It's been well decide in the courts that a small
amount of time off of work for recovery or treatment is a reasonable accomodation.
108. On information and belief, the MSI defendants' discharge of the plaintiff was
motivated by his assertion of his rights to reasonable accommodation, which are protected
under § 75B of chapter 152 as well as under other statutes.
108. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 108.
109. On information and belief, the MSI defendants' refusal to re-employ the plaintiff
was motivated by his assertion of his legal rights to reasonable accommodation, which are
protected under § 75B of chapter 152 as well as under other statutes.
108. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 108.
110. On information and belief, TLC's refusal to directly employ or have MSI re-employ
the plaintiff was motivated by his assertion of his legal rights to reasonable
accommodation against MSI, which are protected under § 75B of chapter 152 as well as
under other statutes.
110. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 110.
111. The facts set forth state claims against all of the defendants under § 75B
of chapter 152 of the General Laws.
111. Defendants state that paragraph 111 contains legal argument to
which no response is required and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 111.
Workers Compensation - Denial of Preference in Hiring
Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 152, § 75A
112. The facts set forth above are hereby incorporated in full with the same force and
effect as if they had been individually realleged herein.
112. Defendants incorporate herein their responses to paragraphs 1
through 111.
113. The plaintiff lost his job with MSI as a result of an injury compensable by MSI
under chapter 152 of the General Laws.
113. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 113.
114. The plaintiff sought re-employment with MSI after obtaining medical treatment that
rendered him able to perform the essential functions of his job or another available job
with reasonable accommodations, within the meaning of § 75B of chapter 152 of the
General Laws.
114. Defendants admit that plaintiff sought re-employment with MSI;
and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 114.
MSI still denies that Silverstein could not do any job after
receiving medical treatment.
115. The MSI defendants and TLC, when it controlled MSI's hiring, denied the plaintiff
preference in hiring, to which he was entitled under § 75A of chapter 152 of the
General Laws.
115. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 115.
116. The facts set forth state claims against all of the defendants under § 75A
of chapter 152 of the General Laws.
116. Defendants state that paragraph 116 contains legal argument to
which no response is required; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 116.
Handicap Discrimination and Retaliation
Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 151B
117. The facts set forth above are hereby incorporated in full with the same force and
effect as if they had been individually realleged herein.
117. Defendants incorporate herein their responses to paragraphs 1
through 116.
118. The plaintiff suffered from a handicap, within the meaning of chapter 151B of the
General Laws.
118. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 118.
119. The plaintiff was regarded by the MSI defendants and TLC as suffering from a
handicap, within the meaning of chapter 151B of the General Laws.
119. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 119.
120. The plaintiff was a qualified handicapped person capable of performing the
essential functions of his job with reasonable accommodation, within the meaning of
§ 4 of chapter 151B of the General Laws.
120. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 120.
Again, MSI denies that Silverstein could do his job.
121. The plaintiff requested various reasonable accommodations for his handicap from
the MSI defendants, including periodic breaks from keyboarding during the work day, days
off for medical treatment, ergonomic consultation and modification to his workstation, and
re-arrangement of his work schedule.
121. Defendants admit that plaintiff requested periodic breaks from
keyboarding during the workday, days off for medical treatment, ergonomic consultation and
modification to his workstation, and re-arrangement of his work schedule; and otherwise
deny the allegations of paragraph 121.
122. In response to those requested accommodations, the MSI defendants subjected the
plaintiff to increased scrutiny, harassment, and direct interference with the plaintiff's
efforts to improve his ability to do his job while maintaining his health.
122. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 122.
123. The plaintiff requested, as a reasonable accommodation, three weeks time off from
work to obtain medical treatment for his handicap.
123. Defendants admit that plaintiff requested three weeks time off
from work to obtain treatment for his medical purported medical condition; and otherwise
deny the allegations of paragraph 123.
124. On information and belief, the MSI defendants discharged the plaintiff on the
basis of handicap and because of his assertion of his rights to reasonable accommodation,
which are protected under § 4 of chapter 151B as well as under other statutes.
124. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 124.
125. On information and belief, the MSI defendants refused to re-employ the plaintiff
on the basis of handicap and because of his assertion of his rights to reasonable
accommodation, which are protected under § 4 of chapter 151B as well as under other
statutes.
125. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 125.
126. The facts set forth set forth claims against all of the MSI defendants (and, to
the extent that TLC and MSI may be treated as a single entity, TLC) under § 4 and
§ 9 of chapter 151B of the General Laws for handicap discrimination.
126. Defendants state that paragraph 111 contains legal arguments to
which no response is required; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 126.
127. The plaintiff brought a charge of handicap discrimination before the Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination ("MCAD") against all of the MSI defendants
other than Richard Gorgens within the 180 days of his discharge by the MSI defendants.
127. Defendants admit that plaintiff brought a charge of handicap
discrimination before the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination against MSI and
Debra Gorgens within 180 days of his discharge; and otherwise deny the allegations of
paragraph 127.
128. More than 90 days have passed since the plaintiff brought his charge of handicap
discrimination before the MCAD.
128. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 128.
129. Subsequent to the filing of his charge of handicap discrimination before the MCAD,
all of the defendants once again refused to re-employ the plaintiff.
129. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 129.
130. The defendants refused to re-employ the plaintiff on the basis of handicap and
because of his assertion of his rights to reasonable accommodation, which are protected
under § 4 of chapter 151B as well as under other statutes.
130. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 130.
131. The MCAD has made no decision about the merits of the plaintiff's charge of
handicap discrimination.
131. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 131.
That's not true anymore, their investators issued an opinion.
132. The plaintiff hereby, pursuant to § 9 of chapter 151B, removes his charge of
handicap discrimination from the MCAD by complaining of those violations in this action
against all of the defendants except Richard Gorgens.
132. Defendants state that paragraph 132 contains no factual
allegations to which a response is required.
Family and Medical Leave Act - 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq.
133. The facts set forth above are hereby incorporated in full with the same force and
effect as if they had been individually realleged herein.
133. Defendants incorporate herein their responses to paragraphs 1
through 132.
134. On information and belief, defendant MSI has been engaged in commerce or in an
industry or activity affecting commence since 1995, within the meaning of §2611 of Title
29 of the United States Code.
134. Defendants admit that MSI has been engaged in commerce or in an
industry or activity affecting commerce since 1995; and otherwise state that paragraph 134
contains legal allegations to which no response is required.
135. On information and belief, during calendar year 1995, defendant MSI had 50 or more
employees for each working day during 20 or more calendar workweeks, within the meaning of
§2611 of Title 29 of the United States Code.
135. Defendants deny that during calendar year 1995, MSI had 50 or
more employees for each working day during 20 or more calendar work weeks; and otherwise
state that paragraph 135 contains legal allegations to which no response is required.
136. On information and belief, during calendar year 1996, defendant MSI had 50 or more
employees for each working day during 20 or more calendar workweeks, within the meaning of
§2611 of Title 29 of the United States Code.
136. Defendants deny that during calendar year 1996, MSI had 50 or
more employees for each working day during 20 or more calendar work weeks; and otherwise
state that paragraph 136 contains legal allegations to which no response is required.
Again, MSI Lies! MSI already admitted that during calendar year
1996, that MSI had 50 or more employees for each working day during 20 or more calendar
workweeks when MSI fired Silverstein.
137. On information and belief, during calendar year 1996, MSI employed at least 50
employees within 75 miles of the worksite at which it employed the plaintiff, within the
meaning of §2611 of Title 29 of the United States Code.
137. Defendants deny that during calendar year 1996, MSI employed at
least 50 employees within 75 miles of the worksite at which it employed plaintiff; and
otherwise state that paragraph 137 contains legal allegations to which no response is
required.
138. On information and belief, during calendar year 1997, defendant MSI had 50 or more
employees for each working day during 20 or more calendar workweeks, within the meaning of
§2611 of Title 29 of the United States Code.
138. Defendants admit that during calendar year 1997, MSI had 50 or
more employees for each working day during 20 or more calendar work weeks; and otherwise
state that paragraph 138 contains legal allegations to which no response is required.
139. On information and belief, during calendar year 1997, MSI employed at least 50
employees within 75 miles of the worksite at which it had previously employed the
plaintiff, within the meaning of §2611 of Title 29 of the United States Code.
139. Defendants admit that during calendar year 1997, MSI employed
at least 50 employees within 75 miles of the worksite at which it had previously employed
the plaintiff; and otherwise state that paragraph 139 contains legal allegations to which
no response is required.
140. Defendants Richard Gorgens, Debra Gorgens, and Larry Mason were, during calendar
years 1996 and 1997, persons who acted in the interest of MSI to MSI's employees, within
the meaning of §2611 of Title 29 of the United States Code.
140. Defendants admit that defendants Richard Gorgens, Debra Gorgens
and Larry Mason were, during calendar years 1996 and 1997, persons who acted in the
interest of MSI to MSI's employees; and otherwise state that paragraph 140 contains legal
allegations to which no response is required.
141. On information and belief, defendant TLC has been engaged in commerce or in an
industry or activity affecting commence since 1996, within the meaning of §2611 of Title
29 of the United States Code.
141. Defendants admit that defendant TLC has been engaged in
commerce or in an industry or activity affecting commerce since 1996; and otherwise state
that paragraph 141 contains legal allegations to which no response is required.
142. On information and belief, during calendar year 1996, defendant TLC had 50 or more
employees for each working day during 20 or more calendar workweeks, within the meaning of
§2611 of Title 29 of the United States Code.
142. Defendants admit that during calendar year 1996, defendant TLC
had 50 or more employees for each working day during 20 or more calendar workweeks; and
otherwise state that paragraph, 142 contains legal allegations to which no response is
required.
143. On information and belief, during calendar year 1997, defendant TLC had 50 or more
employees for each working day during 20 or more calendar workweeks, within the meaning of
§2611 of Title 29 of the United States Code.
143. Defendants admit that during calendar year 1997, defendant TLC
had 50 or more employees for each working day during 20 or more calendar workweeks; and
otherwise state that paragraph 143 contains legal allegations to which no response is
required.
144. On information and belief, during calendar year 1998, defendant TLC had 50 or more
employees for each working day during 20 or more calendar workweeks, within the meaning of
§2611 of Title 29 of the United States Code.
144. Defendants admit that during calendar year 1998, defendant TLC
had 50 or more employees for each working day during 20 or more calendar workweeks; and
otherwise state that paragraph 144 contains legal allegations to which no response is
required.
145. On information and belief, defendant TLC is a successor in interest to defendant
MSI, within the meaning of §2611 of Title 29 of the United States Code.
145. Defendants state that paragraph 145 contains legal allegations
to which no response is required.
146. The plaintiff had, by the time he notified MSI of his need for three weeks' leave
for medical treatment in 1996, been employed by MSI for at least 12 months, during which
time he had been employed for at least 1,250 hours of service with MSI, within the meaning
of §2611 of Title 29 of the United States Code.
146. Defendants admit that by the time he notified MSI of his
purported need for three weeks leave for medical treatment in 1996, plaintiff had been
employed by MSI for at least 12 months, during which time he had been employed for at
least 1,250 hours of service with MSI; and otherwise state that paragraph 146 contains
legal allegations to which no response is required.
147. The plaintiff was given no notice by any of the MSI defendants of the rights of
employees under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), §§ 2601 et seq. of
Title 29 of the United States Code, nor of any procedures he would be required to comply
with to avail himself of those rights.
147. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 147.
MSI's attorney already admitted to the department of Labor that
MSI never mentioned the FMLA to Silverstein.
148. The facts alleged set forth a claim under § 2617 of Title 29 of the United
States Code for intentional violation of § 2615(a) and (b) of Title 29 of the United
States Code by the MSI defendants - and TLC, as MSI's successor in interest as well as to
the extent that MSI and TLC are treated as now being a single entity - for:
(a) interfering with, restraining, and/or denying the plaintiff's exercise of
his right to medical leave,
(b) by discharging the plaintiff for exercising his right to medical leave,
and
(c) discriminating against the plaintiff in denying his requests for
reemployment due to his having:
(i) exercised his right to medical leave under the
FMLA; and
(ii) complained of MSI's actions to the United States
Department of Labor.
148. Defendants state that paragraph 148 contains legal allegations
to which no response is required; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 148.
149. The facts alleged set forth a claim under § 2617 of Title 29 of the United
States Code for intentional violation of § 2615(b) of Title 29 of the United States
Code by TLC for discriminating against the plaintiff in denying his direct requests for
employment with TLC due to his having:
(a) exercised his right to medical leave under the FMLA and
(b) complained of MSI's actions to the United States Department of Labor.
149. Defendants state that paragraph 149 contains legal allegations to which no response
is required; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 149.
150. This Court has jurisdiction to hear these claims under the provisions of
§ 2617 of Title 29 of the United States Code.
150. Defendants state that paragraph 150 contains jurisdictional allegations to which no
response is required; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 150.
151. This count embodies the same cause of action as counts I, II
and III of this Complaint, as they arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact and are
designed to provide redress for the same wrongful actions, although Count III comprehends
a larger number of wrongful actions than do this Count and Counts I and II, due to the
greater scope of prohibited acts under MGL ch. 151B than MGL ch. 152 and the FMLA.
151. Defendants state that paragraph 151 contains legal and
procedural allegations to which no response is required; and otherwise deny the
allegations of paragraph 151.
The defendants had already stipulated to this in their
removal. This has also been decided in the order to
remand.
152. Counts V through VIII also arise out of the series of related events as this Count
and Counts I, II and III, and are thus part of the same cause of action as well.
152. Defendants state that paragraph 152 contains legal and procedural allegations to
which no response is required; and otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 152.
153. Counts I and II of this Complaint, arising under Massachusetts' Workers
Compensation statute, chapter 152, are not removable to federal court under the express
terms of § 1445(c) of Title 28 of the United States Code.
153. Defendants state that paragraph 153 contains legal and jurisdictional allegations to
which no response is required.
154. As this Count embodies the same cause of action as the non-removable Counts, this
case may not be removed to federal court with those Counts, and it may not be removed
separately from those Counts as they constitute a single cause of action with this Count
that may not be split between different courts without the consent of all parties, consent
to which is hereby withheld.
154. Defendants state that paragraph 154 contains legal and jurisdictional allegations to
which no response is required.
Intentional Interference With Advantageous Relationships
155. The facts set forth above are hereby incorporated in full with the same force and
effect as if they had been individually realleged herein.
155. Defendants incorporate herein their responses to paragraphs 1
through 155.
156. The facts set forth above state a claim of unprivileged intentional interference
by defendants Richard Gorgens, Debra Gorgens, and Larry Mason with the plaintiff's
employment with defendant MSI and his potential re-employment by defendants MSI and TLC,
and, to the extent that MSI and TLC are not treated as a single entity, by defendant MSI
for unprivileged intentional interference with the plaintiff's potential employment with
defendant TLC.
156. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 156.
Conversion
157. The facts set forth above are hereby incorporated in full with the same force and
effect as if they had been individually realleged herein.
157. Defendants incorporate herein their responses to paragraphs 1
through 157.
158. The facts set forth above state a claim against MSI - and to the extent that MSI
and TLC are treated as a single entity, TLC as well - for conversion of the plaintiff's
personal property.
158. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 158.
Breach of Contract
159. The facts set forth above are hereby incorporated in full with the same force and
effect as if they had been individually realleged herein.
159. Defendants incorporate herein their responses to paragraphs 1
through 159.
160. The facts set forth above state a claim against MSI - and to the extent that MSI
and TLC are treated as a single entity, TLC as well - for breach of contract.
160. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 160.
Negligent or Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
161. The facts set forth above are hereby incorporated in full with the same force and
effect as if they had been individually realleged herein.
161. Defendants incorporate herein their responses to paragraphs 1
through 160.
162. To the extent that TLC and MSI are not regarded as a single entity, the
actions of TLC set forth above state a claim for negligent or intentional infliction of
emotional distress upon the plaintiff by its refusal to consider him for open positions
due to his having exercised rights against MSI that were protected by state and federal
laws.
162. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 162.
SECOND DEFENSE
The Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
THIRD DEFENSE
Plaintiff was employed at-will and therefore was terminable at-will.
FOURTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff failed to satisfy the administrative prerequisites to bringing some or all of his claims.
FIFTH DEFENSE
Count III is barred as to Richard Gorgens and Larry Mason, as plaintiff failed to file a charge of discrimination against them at the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination.
SIXTH DEFENSE
Counts I and III are barred, as plaintiff was not a qualified handicapped person under M.G.L. c. 152, § 75B and M.G.L. c. 151B.
SEVENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff did not, at times pertinent, suffer from a
"serious health condition" as that term is defined under the Family and Medical
Leave Act ("FMLA").
The defendant cannot expect to this defense to work. The
plaintiff had sugery that required him to be out of work for ten weeks. The plaintiff had
three other medical doctors document the need for time off. The defendants failed to
dispute the in a legal method as detailed in 29 CFR 825.307
In paragraph 104, the defendants allege that the
plaintiff is unable to do his job.
EIGHTH DEFENSE
MSI was not, at times pertinent, an employer under the Family and Medical Leave Act.
NINTH DEFENSE
Counts 1, 11, III and IV against Richard Gorgens, Debra Gorgens
and Larry Mason are barred, as individual liability does not attach under M.G.L. c. 152,
§§ 75A and 75B, M. G. L. c. 15 1 B and the FMLA.
It is well established that under M.G L. c. 151B that
individual liablity does attach. The FMLA, under 29 CFR
825.220(3) states "All persons (whether or not employers)."
Plaintiff has failed to mitigate his damages.
.
ELEVENTH DEFENSE
Count V is barred because the conduct of Richard Gorgens, Debra Gorgens and Larry Mason was privileged.
TWELFTH DEFENSE
Count VIII is barred by the Massachusetts Workers' Compensation Law.
WHEREFORE, defendants request that the Amended Complaint be dismissed and that the Court award them costs and attorneys' fees.
Prayers for Relief
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff prays that this Court advance this case in every way on the docket and grant a speedy trial and, as a result of said trial, he prays and demands that he be awarded his greatest total available recovery after determination of his rights to each of the following:
(1) With respect to his first claim for relief, his lost wages, with interest, an order for reinstatement or front pay, and his reasonable attorney's fees and costs for the protection of his rights, under § 75B of chapter 152.
(2) With respect to his second claim for relief, his lost wages, with interest, an order for reinstatement or front pay, and his reasonable attorney's fees and costs for the protection of his rights, under § 75A of chapter 152.
(3) With respect to his third claim for relief, compensatory damages, including, his lost wages, with interest, an order for reinstatement or front pay and compensation for all other harms suffered, as set forth under paragraph 101 above, plus punitive damages, and his reasonable attorney's fees and costs for the protection of his rights, under § 9 of chapter 151B.
(4) With respect to his fourth claim for relief, his lost wages, with interest, plus an additional amount equal to his lost wages with interest as liquidated damages, plus an order for reinstatement or re-employment or front pay, and his reasonable attorney's fees and costs for the protection of his rights, under § 2617 of Title 29 of the United States Code.
(5) With respect to his fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth claims for relief, his actual damages, with interest and costs, under common law; and
(6) Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and appropriate in this matter.
Jury Demand
The plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all issues herein which may be tried by right of jury and an advisory jury on all factual issues material to claims not triable by right by a jury, pursuant to Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure 39(c).
WILLIAM SILVERSTEIN
By his attorney,
Philip R. Olenick
BBO No. 378605
101 Tremont Street -- Suite 801
Boston, Massachusetts 02108
(617) 357-5660