1. Silverstein's claims in the previous action, entitled Silverstein v. Microsystems Software, Inc. et al., Middlesex Superior CA No. 98-4820 (the "Previous Action") were resolved by offer of judgment in September, 1999 (Second Complaint ś 19). The Microsystems Defendants' Counterclaim was later dismissed without prejudice (Second Complaint ś 30). Silverstein's appeal of the dismissal of the Counterclaim is pending (Second Complaint ś 31).

2. Subsequent to Silverstein's termination, defendant The Learning Company ("TLC") acquired Microsystems and defendant Mattel, Inc. ("Mattel") acquired TLC. "Microsystems Defendants" as used herein shall refer to the three defendants together.

3. On or about March 4, 1997, Silverstein filed his first complaint with the MCAD (Silverstein vs. Microsystems et al, MCAD Docket No. 97-BEM-0674).

4. A copy of the Complaint filed in the Previous Action is attached hereto at Tab A (the "Previous Complaint"). Silverstein appealed the Court's (Sosman, J.) dismissal without prejudice of the Counterclaim in the Previous Action. A copy of Silverstein's appeal is attached hereto at Tab B. The Court may consider pleadings and other materials filed in the Previous Action.See Clark v. Leasecomm Corp. et al, 2000 WL 1512373, at *3 n.7 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2000), citing Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3-4 (lst Cir. 1993)

5. The Microsystems Defendants object to Silverstein's use for any purpose of the settlement documents attached as Exhs. 1 and 2 to the Second Complaint. See Section I, infra.

6. In September, 1999 Silverstein withdrew his first MCAD Complaint only to file a second MCAD Complaint on September 27, 1999 (Silverstein v. Mattel Inc. et al, MCAD Docket No. 99-BEM-2634) (Second Complaint śś 21 & 27).

7. In keeping with the Court's long-standing instruction to save ink and paper by omitting the standards for granting or denying motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, no such authorities are presented here.

8. Claims of retaliation under the Statutes require proof of essentially the same elements. See, G.L. c. 152 S 75B(2) ("No employer . . shall discharge, refuse to hire or in any other manner discriminate against an employee because the employee has exercised a right afforded by this chapter"); G.L. c. 151B § 4(4A) (making it an unlawful practice for any employer "to discourage, expel or otherwise discriminate against any person because he has opposed any practices forbidden under this chapter"); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12203 ("It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment . . . of, any right granted or protected by this chapter"); and 29 U.S.C.A. § 2615 ("It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided by this subchapter"). Claims of retaliation under discrimination statutes such as G.L. c. 152 § 75B(2) and G.L. c. l5lB are "nearly identical". Diaz v. Henry Lee Willis Community Ctr., Inc., 1998 WL 1181731, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1998) (allowing employer's motion for summary judgment on retaliation claims).

9. Moreover, Silverstein can allege no facts to prove intentional or negligent infliction of emotional or physical distress or abuse of process and those claims should be dismissed, because: (1) the filing of a counterclaim is permitted by the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, Mass. R. Civ. P. 13; (2) the filing of a motion for sanctions is permitted by MCAD regulation 804 CMR 1.09(d); (3) the settlement of litigation is encouraged by the courts and therefore these actions cannot amount to "extreme and outrageous" on the part of the Microsystems Defendants and Silverstein's claims must fail.White v. ABC Home Inspection, Inc., 2000 WL 14731744, at *5 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2000) ("Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree, as to go beyondall possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized community."), quoting Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 400 Mass. 82, 99 (1987). Likewise, the abuse of process theory should be dismissed because: (i) it is premature, Gabriel v. Borowy, 324 Mass. 231, 236 (1949) ("One cannot bring an action against a defendant on the ba[s]is that the latter has brought a groundless action until it has been decided in the previous action."); and (ii) counterclaims and settlement discussions do not constitute "process" for abuse of pprocess. Jones v. Brockton Pub. Marketing, 369 Mass. 387, 389 (1975) (affirming dismissal of abuse of process claim and declining to broaden definition of "process" to include injunctions).