1. That letter, which complies with § 9 of chapter 151B, in fact merely memorialized the filing of the first lawsuit in this court a year before. The filing of that lawsuit here a year before was an election that barred the plaintiff from going back to the agency on that case. The letter attached to the defendants' motion was sent to plaintiff's counsel to complete in response to the September 17th letter. It was filled out and returned to the agency as a courtesy. By that point in time, the first MCAD case was, in legal terms, over for approximately a year and could not have been revived. That chain of correspondence is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.

2. Paragraph 4 of section 4 of chapter 151B makes it a violation:

"4. For any person, employer, labor organization or employment agency to discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any person because he has opposed any practices forbidden under this chapter or because he has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under section five."

3. Suffice it to say that permission to sue is only needed from the MCAD if a charge has been pending there less than 90 days (see the second paragraph of § 9 of chapter 151B). Under § 9 one files in court and notifies the MCAD of that filing. The regulation that the defendants' MCAD motion for sanctions quotes does no more than allow a removing plaintiff to ask that the MCAD staff not file their own administrative charge on the same facts. (The plaintiff's removal letter did, in fact, request that the agency "take no further action.") (Continued . . . )

It is somewhat unusual to seek to sanction a party for asking that an agency enforce its own rules. The MCAD motions of the plaintiff that are included as makeweights in that motion were never even ruled on. They would have to be ruled on by the MCAD--and found severely wanting--before sanctions could be imposed by the MCAD on that basis.