1. In the instant case, 804 CMR 1.07(2)(a) does not apply. For 804 CMR 1.07(2)(a) to apply, the respondents would have had to ask for the additional time, prior to the expiration of the prescribed time. A plain reading of this paragraph indicates that the Commission is not permitted to grant additional time sua sponte.

2. One need only look at the summary judgment motion and oppositions to it in connection with the respondents' counterclaim against the plaintiff that is the subject of this proceeding (copies of which I will bring to the investigative conference) to see examples of this sort of conduct, including misrepresentations of fact. The respondents' actions at the summary motion hearing only belies the abusive intent of their counterclaim. When asked by the judge as to what statements were defamatory, the respondents said they would dismiss the case. However , when they filed their dismissal, it was without prejudice to use the threat of renewed litigation to intimidate me.

3. The validity of the claim of violation of chapter 151B I brought in court is not at issue here, both because I was granted a judgment in my favor in that case and because the validity of a retaliation claim does not depend on the validity of the claim of discrimination that inspired the act of retaliation. See Bain v. City of Springfield, 424 Mass. 758, 767-769 (1997), which upheld the recoverability on a retaliation claim, even when the retaliation was for making an invalid claim of discrimination.

4.

The counter-plaintiffs have filed this counterclaim in retaliation for William Silverstein's having exercised his rights under ch. 151B and c. 152 of the Massachusetts General Laws and the federal Family and Medical Leave Act, to intimidate him from exercising his rights, and thus constitutes a prohibited practice under those laws."

5. See Lattimore v. Polaroid, 99 F3d 456 (1st Cir. 1996), which makes this clear.