1.  The oral assertion by counsel for Mattel at the investigative conference that they had attempted to call the Commission's investigator on the telephone before their time to respond had elapsed to request an enlargement of time does not help them, as 804 CMR 1.10(b)specifically states that requests for enlargement of time be "written request of the Respondent, and for good cause shown." An alleged attempt to call a prior investigator on the phone does not meet this requirement.

2. It was clear that the investigator was ignoring a clear reading of the regulations in an effort to move things along. It is in that spirit, despite my objections, I will provide a more descriptive statement of the complaint. The investigator ignoring the regulations permits the respondents to create delays and increase the costs associated with this case.

3. When the complaint was filed on September 27, 1999, the last act was the refusal to dismiss the counterclaim unless I agreed to silence about my case, coupled with a demand for additional discovery on the counterclaim. (See the attached copy of that correspondence.)

However, this is a systemic continuing violation, and more wrongful acts have happened since. The respondents opposed the motion I served and filed seeking summary judgment against the counterclaim, and then moved successfully, over my opposition, to be allowed to dismiss the counterclaim "without prejudice"--which would allow them to use the threat to revive their libel claim to demand that I agree to silence. I am currently appealing from the court's letting them dismiss without prejudice and refusing to rule on my motion for summary judgment, which would have ended that case for real. Unless they let my appeal proceed unopposed they will continue to be acting in furtherance of that continued threat--and even if they sit on their hands and do nothing to oppose my appeal, I will have to bear the cost of that appeal, which I regard as additional damages from their retaliatory conduct.

4. The validity of the claim of violation of chapter 151B I brought in court is not at issue here, both because I was granted a judgment in my favor in that case and because the validity of a retaliation claim does not depend on the validity of the claim of discrimination that inspired the act of retaliation. See Bain v. City of Springfield, 424 Mass. 758, 765-769 (1997), which upheld the right to recover punitive damages for retaliation against an individual for having complained publicly of discrimination, even when the claim of discrimination being retaliated for was not successful and there were no actual damages awarded (see the text accompanying footnote 4 on page 765 of that opinion).

5. See Lattimore v. Polaroid, 99 F3d 456 (1st Cir. 1996), which makes this clear.

6  Attached as exhibit A.

7. This is prior to the counterclaim. Even to this day, the respondents refuse to provide any evidence that any statements were false.

8.  The respondents the instant case are the corporate defendants in the original case.

9. Attached as exhibit B.

10. As evidenced by their motion to dismiss, when the judge asked what statements where libelous.

11.  Even without the judgment being entered by the defendants, the MCAD investigative report stated that, "case is leaning towards a probable cause finding." One would think that it is reasonable to believe the report of the MCAD investigator.